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NOTRE DAME LAWYER

forced is to abrogate this provision of the statute, or to amend it by
substituting therefor the French rule, namely that the law of the nationality is to govern."
Thus is the law in the United States in regard to the application of
renvoi whenever a situation arises where renvoi might figure as a
problem. The Tallmadge case is the pilot that guides the courts of all
the states to steer clear of renvoi.
There are exceptions, of course. The Restatement of the Law of
Conflict of Laws gums up the matter this way. "Except as stated in
section 8, when there is a difference in the Conflict of Laws of two
states whose laws are involved in a problem, the rule of Conflict of
Laws of the forum is applied; (a) in all cases where as a preliminary
of legal ideas, these are determined by the forum according to its law;
(b) where in making the choice of law to govern a certain situation
the law of another state is to be applied, since the only Conflict of
Laws used in the determination of the case is the Conflict of Laws of
the forum, the foreign law to be applied is the law applicable to the
matter in hand and not the Conflict of Laws of the foreign state."
In section 8 are set out the exceptions: "(1) All questions of title to
land are decided in accordance with the law of the state where the
land is, including the Conflict of Laws rules of that state. (2) All
questions concerning the validity of a decree of divorce are decided in
accordance with the law of the domicile of the parties, including the
Conflict of Laws rules of that state." 8
J. Barrett Guthrie.

RECENT DECISIONS
CER=CATrES O CONVENMNCF AND NEcEssrrY. South Mississippi Airways v.
Chicago and Southern Airlines, 26 So. (2d) 455 (1946).-Certificates of public convenience and necessity for the operation of airlines were granted to three companies
by the Public Service Commission of Mississippi. The protestants appealed to a
circuit court which vacated the order because the commission was without authority
to grant the certificates sought.
Therefore, two of the applicants brought this action and attempted to show that
the state legislature had in fact included airlines as subject to a "common carrier"
status. The appellees argued that the words "other common carriers" appear usually
in conjunction with the word "railroad" in order to make it unnecessary to repeat
the other common carriers by name. It was noted, too, that the legislature did not
specifically name airlines in this category in the Public Service Commission Act of
1938 (Code 1942, Section 7688 et seq.). Moreover, the same code required that
every person navigating any aircraft within the state, and carrying a passenger,
must have a certificate of authorization from the proper Federal agency of the
8
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Department of Commerce as well as a pilot's license from that same body. This it
was said indicated further that the legislature was willing to leave control of aircraft to the Federal government.
Applicants, however, believed that airlines are common carriers by implication.
For example, it was said in a New York case, Anderson v. Fidelity and Casualty
Co., 228 N. Y. 475, 127 N. E. 584, 9 A. L. R. 1544 (1920) that,
Today, as is practically conceded by counsel for both parties in the instant
case, the term "common carrier" should be applied to the "jitney bus", and
tomorrow, in a proper case, it may well be that it may be applied to that
most recent device for eliminating the fetters of distance, the aeroplane.
That court could see no good reason why there could not be common carriers by
airplane. In a later case in that state it was held that a state may prescribe air
traffic regulations for intra-state operations. People v. Katz, 140 Misc. 46, 249
N. Y. S. 719 (1931).
These statements were relied on by applicants solely for their possible persuasive effects on the court. Their effect was nil. Furthermore, before applying for
certificates of public convenience and necessity the applicants had obtained a
written opinion from the office of the Attorney General which upheld their view.
This, too, was an assertion of interpretation which carried no weight as far as the
court was concerned. Nor was the court able to find support for the appellants'
contention that the terms "highway" and "motor vehicle" as used in the Act of
1938 were applicable to support their case.
While it is true that an airplane may be considered to be a vehicle and subject
to state control as a "common carrier," the definition of "highway" in the Motor
Carrier Regulatory Act was limited to roads on the ground and not to air routes.
This precluded a construction of the Public Service Commission's power consistent
with the arguments of appellants.
There is nothing inconsistent with previous decisions in this ruling. The
Mississippi court was not prepared to make a judicial law in a case in which the
legislature alone has jurisdiction. Nor was the judiciary ready to set aside stare
decisis. It had been held twenty years earlier that "The Railroad Commission has
no implied power." Illinois Cent. R. Co. et al. v. Mississippi R. Commission et al,
143 Miss. 805, 109 So. 868 (1926). This, moreover, is not a local opinion as is
demonstrated by the citations listed by appellees. Where a statute confers specific
powers on a tribunal, board or commission with limited powers, such as Public
Service Commissions, its powers are limited to those specifically mentioned in the
statute. Bamberger Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 59 Utah 351, 204
P. 314 (1922); People ex. rel. Public Service Interstate Transportation Co., Inc. v.
Public Service Commission et al., 262 N. Y. 39, 186 N. E. 195 (1933); Union
Pacific R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 103 Utah 186, 134 P. (2d) 469 1943).
A Public Service Commission is an administrative creature of the legislature
and its powers, specifically enumerated in statutes, may not be implied.
Evidently the law-making body of Mississippi has decided, as is seen in its
statutes, that there is no present necessity for the creation of a monopoly in this
newest form of transportation. The court did well to resist the temptation to

anticipate future social policy and "imply" the "meaning" of the legislature accordingly.
Charles T. Dunn.
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ARamscrAL MARKET AND FAiR PRICE. Cudahy Packing Co. v. United States,
155 F. (2d) 905. June 4, 1946.-This was an action by Cudahy Brothers against the
United States to recover compensation allegedly due for requisitioned beef carcasses. There was a judgment in favor of the United States. The plaintiff appealed
and the United States Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
The plaintiff was engaged in the slaughtering of cattle, hogs, and sheep, and
in the preparation and sale, at wholesale, of fresh beef and other meat products.
On June 16, 1943, the President of the United States, acting through his authorized
agent, requisitioned at plaintiff's plant, seventy-five beef carcasses and a Director
of the Office of Food Distribution Administration determined the fair and just
compensation for the carcasses taken was $9,409.09, but plaintiff refused to accept
that amount. Thereupon defendant, pursuant to the Statute, U. S. C. A. Section
721 (1941), paid plaintiff fifty percent or $4,702.05 of the $9,409.09, and the
plaintiff, claiming that the value of the carcasses was $12,191.49, brought this
action to recover what it claimed was fair and just compensation for requisitioned
carcasses. The aforementioned statute reads: "If, upon any requisition of property,
the person entitled to receive -the amount so determined by the President as the
fair and just compensation for the property is unwilling to accept the same as
full and complete compensation for such property he shall be paid 50 percent of
such amount and shall be entitled to sue the United States in any district court of
the United States . . .for an additional amount which, when added to the amount
so paid to him, he considers to be fair. and just compensation for such property."
The Court found that prior to June 16, 1943, the Office of Price Administration
had fixed a ceiling price for beef carcasses, and that when the carcasses were taken,
there was an established market at Cudahy, Wisconsin, and that the market value
of the carcasses was $9,404.09. The plaintiff's argument is that "fair value and just
compensation" presupposes the existence of a free market; that in our case, no free
market prevailed; and that in such a situation, resort should be had to indices of
value other than an artificially created market.
The Court agreed that just compensation includes all elements of value that
inhere in the property, but it does not exceed market value fairly determined,
Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246 (1933), and where there is a market price
prevailing at the time and place of taking, that price is just compensation. United
States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341 (1922).
Judge Kerner in his opinion pointed out the distinction between the consequences of a seizure and the consequences of the imposition of lawful war-time
restriction on price and the law is well settled that the imposition of use and price
is a proper exercise of sovereign war powers and that the resulting market conditions are lawful. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1943). The principles
enunciated in the cases cited impel to the conclusion that the market price at
which the property is actually bought and sold at the time of the taking is the
measure of just compensation and that the causes which control or affect the
market at the time are immaterial.
Edward J. Flattery.

Hughes Tool Co.
INJUNCTION-CoNsTITUTioNAL LAW MONOPOLIS--CONTRACT.
v. Motion Picture Ass'n oj America, Inc., 66 Fed. Supp. 9, Oct. 14, 1946.--"The
Outlaw" has aroused, in the past months, a great amount of publicity in which the
main struggle has been between Howard Hughes, the now famous multi-millionaire,
and the defendant, which defendant represents a movement in this country to induce Hollywood film producers to produce entertainment of less scandalous nature.
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Plaintiff seeks an injunction pendente lite, restraining defendant from revoking,
or taking any steps looking to, the revocation of the seal of approval granted by
defendant on May 23, 1941, to plaintiff's motion picture "The Outlaw," and from
combining or conspiring with or among its members to prevent or impair plaintiffs distribution and exhibition of such picture.
Defendant received notice, by Judge Leibell, restraining the said defendant and
its officers and agent from (1) revoking or taking any steps looking to the revocation of that seal of approval, and (2) taking any action in respect to the advertising used by plaintiff in connection with the exhibition of the motion picture,
"The Outlaw."
The defendant, a voluntary membership corporation, is composed of the
majority of producing and distributing companies of the United States, and has a
close and effective working relationship with about 95% of the producing, distributing and exhibiting companies in the motion picture industry. Under its constitution and by-laws, there -has been created a system of censorship to certain
codes established by a Productive Code Administration and an Advertising Code
Administration, both organizations within defendant corporation. All films produced
by its members are required to be submitted to the PCA and ACA for their respective approval before the films receive the defendant's seal of approval. The
advertising of these films must also be approved by the ACA.
"The Outlaw" was produced by the plaintiff in 1941. This film plus the advertising was submitted to the PCA and ACA, respectively, for approval. After
much correspondence between plaintiff and defendant as to some changes to be
made, the defendant corporation granted its seal of approval with the condition
that certain changes be made in the films as well as in its advertising. The plaintiff
claims damages in the sum of $1,000,000 because of the rejection of the advertising by the defendant.
In its second claim, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant and its members entered into an agreement and conspiracy to hinder and suppress competition in the
interstate sale, distribution and showing of motion picture films, and to create a
monopoly in said industry by reason of the economic control centered in the seal.
That such practice violates the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States as well as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U. S. C. A., Sec. 1-7, 15 note.
In conclusion, the plaintiff seeks damages in the sum of $5,000,000.
It was shown at the trial that the defendant approved 187 stills of the picture
out of 202; twenty-six newspaper advertisements were approved, while twenty
were rejected. The rejected ones were in the nature of ink drawings, in which the
breasts of the star were emphasized and exposed. Others were rejected because they
showed a man and woman together in hay in a compromising horizontal position.
Late in April, 1946, it is alleged by the defendant, and not denied, a sky-writing
airplane wrote the words, "The Outlaw" in the sky over Pasadena, and then made
two enormous circles with a dot in the middle of each.
In its ruling, the court expressed its approval of the defendant's work and purpose of its organization. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that the defendant
showed known discrimination on its part against the plaintiff. The fact that the
defendant approved a portion of the advertisement of "The Outlaw" indicated
the defendant to be willing to cooperate with the plaintiff.
As to the violation of the First Amendment, the court found the plaintiff not
to be restrained from his right to practice free speech. Defendant's disapproval of
plaintiff's advertisement was no such violation. The court held that the defendant
does not seek to invade the plaintiff's tight of free speech and press; but seeks only
to deny plaintiff's right to do whatever he sees fit under the defendant's seal of
approval. The granting of the "seal" is strictly up to the defendant.
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The court reasoned that, if the seal contract can be said to be illegal because
of the alleged violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, plaintiff cannot in the
same breath enforce it and attack it. Both parties, in this cause of action, are in
pari delicto, and in such cases, the court will not lend its aid to either party.
The court further noted that some of the defendant's members, who distribute
motion pictures, have agreed that they will not "release, distribute or promote the
release or distribution or in any way, directly or indirectly, make available for release or distribution any motion picture which has not theretofore been approved,"
is not a violation of the Act. That the defendant has a moral obligation to the
public and if there is any restraint by the defendant in this case, it is a reasonable
one.
Frank P. Salierno.
Lawrence Turner.

Brooklyn National League Baseball Club, Incorporatedv. Pasquel
CONSPmACY.
et al. District Court, E. D. Missouri, 117 Fed. Supp. 117 (1946).-Charging the
defendants with conspiracy to induce professional baseball players under contract
to go to Mexico to play professional baseball, the Brooklyn National League Baseball Club brought action for a temporary injunction against the defendants Jorge
Pasquel and Bernardo Pasquel individually as agents of the Mexican League and
against Ray J. Gillespie.
Gillespie had been a sports writer for twenty-seven years, and at the time of
this action was employed by the St. Louis Star Times. The Pasquels were engaged
in promoting organized baseball in Mexico, and had called on Gillespie for services,
including securing baseball equipment and hotel reservations and interviewing ball
players and umpires. Of the ball players interviewed, only "Mickey" Owen was in
organized baseball. The plaintiff alleged that it had Owen under contract when,
in the spring of 1946, Owen was sent to Gillespie's office where he received a bonus
for signing a contract to play ball in Mexico for the Pasquels. Gillespie signed for
the Pasquels. Owen was interviewed and had a picture taken of himself and his
bonus check, for publication by Gillespie. Before Gillespie signed the contract,
Owen repeatedly assured him that he was not under contract to plaintiff.
Gillespie also figured in the approach made to one Reiser, a contract player of
the plaintiff who was interviewed in New York by representatives of Pasquel who
attempted to induce him to break his contract and advised him to contact Gillespie
on arrival in St. Louis. Reiser never did contact Gillespie, who denied that he
knew of Reiser having been referred to him, although he admitted making hotel
reservations in St. Louis at this time for representatives of the Pasquels. Gillespie
maintained that his interest in associating with Pasquel Brothers was their promise
to him of exclusive stories on players signed. He denied being party to a conspiracy to induce players to violate contracts with organized baseball.
In dismissing the action as to the defendant Gillespie, the court stated that although Gillespie was undoubtedly the agent for Pasquel Brothers, his agency was
not general, but was limited to specific purposes, and he received specific instructions for each of his acts. The court further maintained that: "The record is
barren that he (Gillespie) ever knowingly contacted a player under contract or of
facts which such knowledge could be imputed ... . Although a conspiracy may be
and usually is proven by circumstantial evidence . . . suspicion will not sustain a
judgment."
The Court dismissed the action as to the Pasquel Brothers because of lack of
jurisdiction. The plaintiff had based its claim to jurisdiction of the Court over the
non-resident defendants, the Pasquel Brothers, on service on Gillespie, since service
upon an agent is sufficient notice for his principal concerning an application for a
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preliminary injunction. Since the action was dismissed against the resident defendant, he plaintiff found itself in the unhappy position of seeking a preliminary
injunction against non-resident defendants, neither of whom had been served in the
district or had entered their appearance. In dismissing the action against the Pasquel
Brothers the Court stated, "The weight of authority supports the conclusion that
the preliminary injunction here sought is an action in person and the defendants
being non-residents and not served within the District and not having entered
their appearance, their court is without jurisdiction to enter the order sought
against them. As to such defendants the action will be dismissed without prejudice."
John M. Anderton.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATiON. Reynolds Metal Co. v. Glass et al., 195 S. W.
(2d) 280, ...... Ky ....... , (June 14, 1946).-On June 7, 1944, one Emma Virginia
Glass, an employee of appellant, Reynolds Metal Company, sustained a fatal accident. Both employer and employee had elected to operate under the provisions
of the Workmen's Compensation Act (KRS 342.001 et seq.). With their father as
next friend, the decedent's minor children, who were living in the home of and supported by the two parents at the time their mother sustained fatal injuries, made
application to the compensation board for an award of appropriate compensation.
The full board approved the finding of a referee that the surviving infant children
were entitled to $12 per week for four hundred weeks. This appeal nsued.

Appellant contends that the "deceased employee" - though a parent - does
not embrace both father and mother, but refers only to the parent who is primarily obligated to support them and with whom the wholly dependents were
chiefly supported at the time of such parent's death, and with whom "such child
or children (wholly dependents) are living or by whom actually supported at the
time of the accident."
The judgment was for the appellee and the Court of Appeals held that a dependent's child's right to compensation is based' on the employee status of the deceased parent, and the right is the same whither the employee is father or mother.
The court says, too, that there is a conclusive statutory presumption that the children are wholly dependent and an age of less than sixteen years is the only condition of the right of such children to receive compensation.
Appellant further contended that other sections of the Kentucky Statutes have
some bearing upon the proper interpretation of the compensation act, and cites as
one of his examples, section 405.020, which says that "the father shall be primarily liable for the nurture and education of his minor children." However, the
necessity-for consideration of other statutes arises only when the statute under
consideration, and to be construed is, at least to some extent, ambiguous. In the
instant case, the court said that the language of the controverted clause in the
compensation statute was plain and unambiguous to the effect that children of a
deceased parent with whom they are living "shall be presumed to be wholly dependent upon a deceased employee," who in this case was their mother with whom
they were living and each of them were of the age making them such wholly dependents. The presumption of "wholly" dependent children in the described circumstances is conclusive and cannot be contradicted, and since the appellees are
within the class of wholly dependents and occupy the status described in the
statute, they are entitled to receive compensation provided by the Act due them as
such dependents.
The suggestion that double compensation might result if the surviving parent
died within the payment period (four hundred weeks) was made by appellant, who
submitted that such was not the intention of the General Assembly. The court
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found nothing in the entire compensation act remotely intimating the absence of
such legislative intent. The dictum of the court impliedly asserts that such double
allowance could be allowed in case of the death of both parents in the circumstances indicated. The compensation, which the dependents would receive concurrently for the death of both parents, would by no means be an extravagant
allowance, and would be granted if such a situation were to arise.
George S. Stratigos.

AiR CommEC - FnrH AMENDMENT - TAKiNG. United States v. Causby
et ux, 66 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1062 (1946); 90 L. Ed. Adv. Ops. 971; 14 U. S. Law Week
4360.--On certiorari, a reversal and remanding for more specific findings, of a
decision by the Court of Claims allowing $2,000 damages to the plaintiff.
Respondent's home is located near the municipal airport of Greensboro, N. C.,
from which there were frequent flights over his land by United States aircraft.
These planes included bombers, transports and fighters which passed over the
respondent's land at low altitudes, at frequent intervals, in taking off and landing.
The noise of the engines, glare of the landing lights and proximity of the craft
have made respondent's family fearful and nervous, caused them to lose sleep
and have forced the abandonment of his poultry business because his chickens,
upon being frightened, flew into the walls killing themselves.
On the basis of these facts the Court of Claims found a depreciation of respondent's property due to the easement "taken" by the United States. Value of the
property destroyed and the easement taken was $2,000.
Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court, noting at the beginning
that this was a case of first impression.
The United States contends that by certain statutes, Air Commerce Act of 1926,
44 Stat. 568, 49 U. S. C., Sec. 171 et seq., 49 U. S. C. A., Sec. 171 et seq., as
amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, 49 U. S. C., Sec. 401
et seq. 49 U. S. C. A., Sec. 401, it has "complete and exclusive national sovereignty
in the airspace" over this country. Under these Acts every citizen is granted freedom of transit in air commerce "through the navigable air space of the United
States." Navigable airspace is "airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight
prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority." 49 U. S. C., Sec. 180, 49 U. S.
C. A., Sec. 180. Consequently, it is argued, these flights within the minimum safe
altitude prescribed are merely the exercise of that right. The United States claimed
that "without any physical invasion of the property of the landowners there had
been no taking of property" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution.
Mr. Justice Douglas proceeded to note the Common Law maxim of property
rights - Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, 1 Coke, Institutes, 19 Ed.
1832, ch. 1, Sec. 1 (4a); 2 Blackstone, Commentaries, Lewis Ed. 1902, p. 18; 3
Kent, Commentaries, Gould Ed. 1896, p. 621, declaring "that doctrine has no
place in the modem world." He explained that today the air is a public highway.
It was conceded by the United States that if the respondent's property had been
made untenable there would be a "taking" compensable under the Fifth Amendment. Here the land was not completely destroyed, Mr. Justice Douglas continued,
but that is not controlling. "The use," he added, "of the airspace immediately
above the land would limit the utility of the land and a diminution in its value."
It was pointed out that the angle of glide does not operate to extend the minimum
safe altitude declared by the C.AA. and that therefore "the flights in question
were not within the navigable airspace which Congress placed within the public
domain." Although, it continued, airspace is a public highway, "if the landowner
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is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere." However, all "airspace, apart from
the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain." Under South
Carolina statutes, Mr. Justice Douglas points out, such interference with the right
to enjoy property is illegal. In this case an easement was taken and it must be
determined whether it is of a permanent or temporary nature in assessing damages. Therefore the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded to the Court
of Claims for more specific findings of fact.
Mr. Justice Black dissented giving it as his opinion that there was no taking
shown by the facts. He suggests rather that there might be a remedy in tort for
the nuisance of the noise and lights incident to the flying. But, the opinion continues, "the concept of taking property as used in the Constitution has heretofore
never been given so sweeping a meaning." By statute, 44 Stat. 568, 5 Stat. 973, it is
provided that the United States of America is "to possess and exercise complete and
exclusive national sovereignty in the air space (over) the United States." This
statute is based on the assumption that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution
gave Congress the plenary right to control navigable airspace and, it is argued, the
Court ought not to limit this power. Mr. Justice Black declares that a distinction
between "safe altitudes of flight" and "safe altitudes" for take-off and landing,
both of which are regulated by C.A.A. is unwarranted. He continues, arguing that
"Old concepts of private ownership of land should not be introduced into the field
of air regulation." The dissenting opinion concludes that there should be a reversal
on the grounds that there was no "taking" in the sense the word is used in the
Constitution.
Mr. Justice Burton joined in the dissent.
As a case of first impression this decision is significant in that it interprets the
phrase "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation," in the Fifth Amendment, as applying to flights of government planes which
appreciably depreciate the value of the realty over which they fly. It is established
that such activity constitutes the taking of an easement over property, thus reasserting that a landowner has the right to all the airspace adjacent to his land
which he might use either by physical occupation or as a prerequisite to enjoyment of that physically occupied.
Joh E. Cosgrove.

AGREEMNT NoT To APPLY FoR RENT INCREASE HELo SUPICUENT CONSmERATION. In re Dreir's Estate, 62 N. Y. (2d) 722.-In this recent decision handed
down by Surrogate Witmer, Surrogate's Court, Monroe County, New York, we
find the opinion as to adequate consideration in this timely contractual problem
firmly and soundly based on principles governing contracts.

The claimants are Harold W. Atwood and Edna, his wife, who were related to
the decedent, Eliza B. Dreir, and lived in the adjoining part of a double house
owned by her. The decedent died early in December and about a week later the
heirs gathered for the reading of the will. The executors of the will discussed the
question of maintenance of the house, and it was finally agreed that the heirs
would not make an application to the rental division of the federal Office of Price
Administration for an increased rental from the Atwoods if they would maintain,
care, and prevent damage to the adjoining part of the building, which would be
unoccupied during the winter months. A fire was to be kept in the furnace to prevent freezing of the pipes, and inspection was to be made from time to time.
The relationship between the decedent and the Atwoods probably was the reason
for the low rental that was paid, although at the time of the discussions neither
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the claimant nor the other heirs knew if an increase would be granted. In the late
spring the executors sold the house and the new owner made application to raise
the claimant's rent, but the O.P.A. refused the increase. The claimants now contend
that the agreement that they made in December with the executors was in reality
without consideration and therefore they should be able to collect a judgment for
services rendered on a quantum meruit basis.
The court in this case disallowed the Atwood's claim because there was indeed
sufficient consideration given by the relinquishment of the right to at least apply
for the increase in rental, even though neither party was certain of the decision
that might be given by the O.P.A. The agreement was entered into on good faith
and there was no evidence shown of deceit or fraud on the part of the executors.
There have been various other cases, held to be binding, where a promise to forbear to bring action against another party has been held to be sufficient consideration.
To support their claim the Atwoods cite Haussman v. Rowland, 53 N. Y. S.
(2d) 440 (1944). In this case the tenant's lease was extended on condition that
the tenant would do certain painting or redecorating which, because of high prices,
was in substance an increase in rent, and was illegal under O.P.A. regulations. Our
case on the other hand was a legal consideration to refrain from applying to the
O.P.A. and as such, violated none of their ceilings. This is a confusion on the
claimant's part of illegal consideration and failure of consideration. The question of
duress 'and improper coercion of a tenant was brought out by the claimants but
once again their plea was defeated because they did not go against public policy.
Only partial failure was held on the basis that a state law said that thirty day
notice had to be given for rent increases and therefore no detriment would have occurred until February 1, 1945. This was ruled out as far as the main question is
concerned, and in final summary the court took a line from an older case on the
subject, Harvey v. J. P. Morgan and Co., 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 520 (1937), "the
slightest consideration is sufficient for the greatest undertaking."

Richard H. Keen.

ORDINANCES PROHIBITnWc TR.A]ERs.-Lower Merion Township, 46 Atl. (2d) 35,
........ Pa ......... (1946).-This was an action by the Lower Merion Township involving the validity of a building code ordinance, as it applies to house trailers.

In 1931, Lower Merion Township enacted a building code fixing certain minimum requirements relating to light, air, sanitation and safety of buildings thereafter erected. The buildings were classified according to use, among them dwellings. Penalities were provided for those who built, used or permitted to be used
any non-conforming buildings including dwellings.
In 1940, the Township amended its building code, by adding Section 200,
reading: "House trailer means any vehicle for living purposes within the township for an aggregate of more than thirty days in any period of one year, it shall
be considered as a single family dwelling for all purposes of this ordinance."
This action, testing as it does the enforcement of a building code in these days
of critical housing shortages, is quite important, and since this is one of first impression in Pennsylvania, it will undoubtedly be cited often to sustain or disprove
positions of the relative parties in subsequent disputes.
The facts briefly are these: Since the enactment of the 1940 building code,
Darwyn Gallup permitted house trailers to be placed on his ground and to be
used and occupied as dwellings for several years without interruption. One trailer
had been cited in particular. The wheels had been removed and the trailer had
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been propped up on boxes with an enclosed -foundation. Electric lights were
strung from a main electric line, running water piped to each trailer, and all
trailers used common toilet and shower -facilities. Since this camp did not conform to the requirements of the building code in a great number of respects, including sanitation and windows, the township brought this action.
Gallup contends that a current housing shortage ought to make the ordinance
void. However, Judge O'Reilly stated in the opinion ".. . With neither the wisdom
of the ordinance nor the rationality of its enforcement have we anything to do.
These have been confided by our constitution, not to the courts, but to the other
two coordinate branches of the government."
For the disregard of the ordinance, Gallup was subjected to a penalty.
In closing it is interesting to note that the Oregon Supreme Court might not
agree with this decision. On October 22, 1946. (according to Seattle Times of
that date), the Oregon Supreme Court lashed at property owners' objecting to
use of a city park for veterans' trailer houses at Eugene and refused to issue an
injunction.
The unanimous opinion, written by Chief Justice Harry H. Belt, said: "It
is difficult to reconcile the mental attitude of persons whose aesthetic senses are
shocked by these unsightly trailer houses and yet make no objection to the use
of the park as a cow pasture.
"We apprehend that these veterans and their families - including in many
instances very young babies - will be as happy to vacate these trailer homes
after the emergency ends as the plaintiffs will be to have them go."
Many of the veteran's houses in the 100-trailer unit are those of the students
at the University of Oregon.
F. Gerard Feeney.

CONTEMPT - Fa mom or Paxss.-Pennekamp v. Florida, 66 Sup. Ct. 1029
(1946).-On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida to review a judgment affirming a judgment of guilt in a contempt of court proceeding on a citation by the Circuit Court of Dade County. Reversed.
Pennekamp, individual petitioner and associate editor of the Miami Herald,
together with the corporate petitioner who was the publisher of the paper were
responsible for the publication of two editorials charged by the citation to be contemptuous of the Circuit Court and its judges in that they were unlawfully critical
of the administration of criminal justice in certain cases then pending before the
Court. After a finding of guilty the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari and reversed.
Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the court.
In reviewing the Bridges v. California case I he says importance must be given
to the "clear and present danger rule" and goes on to say "The evil consequence
of comment must be 'extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
before utterances can be punished.'" He states: "Reviewing courts are brought in
cases of this type to appraise the comment on a balance between the desirability
of free discussion and the necessity for fair adjudication, free from interruption
1
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of its processes." After examining the editorials in question and pointing out that
while the cases were being heard at the time of publication and that the editorials
did not portray the judges' attitudes, he emphasizes, however, that the Court must
"weigh the right of free speech . . . against the danger of coercion and intimidation of courts in the factual situation presented by this record." He further states
that the editorials could not be considered as constituting a "clear and present
danger" to the administration of justice in Florida but were "only criticism of
judicial action already taken . . ." Mr. Justice Reed states that publications such
as the ones in question could not be considered as bringing influence upon judges
and that the administration of justice has not been influenced.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in delivering a concurring opinion stated, "A free
press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary nor an independent
judiciary to a free press." He holds: "every time a situation- like the present one
comes here the precise problem before us is to determine whether the state court
went beyond the allowable limits of judgment in holding that conduct which has
been punished as a contempt was reasonably calculated to endanger a state's duty
to administer impartial justice . . ."
Mr. Justice Murphy in concurring states that such publications must constitute
a real threat to the administration of justice in order that they may be considered
dangerous. "That situation is not even remotely present in this case."
Mr. Justice Rutledge in delivering a concurring opinion said that allowance
must be granted to publications in reporting legal news. He states that "there
is perhaps no area of news more inaccurately reported factually, on the whole,
though with some notable exceptions, than legal news. Some part of this is due
to carelessness . . . a small portion to bias . . . but a great deal . . . to ignorance
which frequently is not at all blameworthy." His closing statement: "The statements in question are clearly fair comment in large part. Portions exceed that
boundary. But the record does not disclose that they tended in any way to block
or obstruct the functioning of the judicial process."
John C. Mowbray.

DivRrTy op CITIzENsHIP IN REFERENCE TO RESIDENTS OF THE DISTRICT Or
CoLUmIA.-Ostrow v. Samuel Brilliant Co., 66 Fed. Supp. 593 (1946).-This
was an action for damages brought by the plaintiff, a resident of the District of
Columbia, against the defendant, a Massachusetts corporation. No basis of jurisdiction, other than diversity of citizenship, was alleged in the complaint. The
court raised the jurisdictional question of its own motion.

The question of the case was the constitutionality of an amendment to 28
U. S. C. A. No. 41, (1), which was effected in 1940. This amendment purported to
read that the residents of the District of Columbia should be regarded as citizens
of a foreign state wherever the question of diversity of citizenship arises as a
basis of jurisdiction in the federal courts. Until 1933, there was prevalent opinion
among the legal minds that Congress could not diversify jurisdiction so far as the
constitutionality of the measure is concerned. This amendment was the culmination of the efforts fostered by the deviation from the opinion as mentioned above.
The principle marks the fifth attempt of the various federal courts to determine the constitutionality of this amendment; the box score thus far:

